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ABSTRACT
Alex, a Grey parrot (Psittacus erithacus) who identifies the bigger or smaller of two objects by reporting its
color or matter using a vocal English label and who states ``none'' if they do not differ in size, was
presented with two-dimensional Müller-Lyer figures (Brentano form) in which the central lines were of
contrasting colors. His responses to ``What color bigger/smaller?'' demonstrated that he saw the standard
length illusion in the Müller-Lyer figures in 32 of 50 tests where human observers would also see the
illusion and reported the reverse direction only twice. He did not report the illusion when (a) arrows on the
shafts were perpendicular to the shafts or closely approached perpendicularity, (b) shafts were 6 times
thicker than the arrows, or (c) after being tested with multiple exposures--conditions that also lessen or
eliminate the illusion for human observers. These data suggest that parrot and human visual systems
process the Müller-Lyer figure in analogous ways despite a 175-fold difference in the respective sizes of
their brain volumes. The similarity in results also indicates that parrots with vocal abilities like Alex's can
be reliably tested on visual illusions with paradigms similar to those used on human subjects.

1. Introduction
Given that the goal of the visual system is to process information accurately--as a matter of survival--the
ability of the human brain to be fooled by optical illusions attracts considerable empirical and theoretical
interest. The study of optical illusions in birds, small prey-animals with the capacity for flight and thus
likely an even greater need for visual accuracy, would provide important insights into the processing
strategies of the avian visual system. Some perceptual tasks, such as occlusion on non-optical-illusion
visual object recognition, recognition-by-component (eg DiPietro et al 2002; van Hamme et al 1992; also
Cook 2001) or detecting patterns of non-random perceptual structure (eg Cook et al 2005) have been
examined in birds, but only a few conclusive studies on optical illusions have been performed on subjects
with a visual system markedly different from those of primates (eg Fujita et al 1993; Nakamura et al
2006). How might non-mammalian brains process such information?
The avian brain is anatomically distinct from that of mammals but, at least for birds such as corvids and
psittacids, differs quantitatively rather than qualitatively from mammals when processing certain cognitive
tasks (eg Emery and Clayton 2004; Jarvis et al 2005; Pepperberg 1999, 2006); for tasks that primarily
involve visual processing, however, differences may be more striking. Some avian systems differ
considerably from those of humans in both structure and function (eg the double fovea of raptors--see

Frost et al 1990). In humans, object recognition is associated with ventral streams of the extrastriate
visual areas; object position and motion are associated with dorsal streams; and, overall, the
lemnothalamic pathway is highly developed with respect to vision. For pigeons, in contrast, the
collothalamic pathway is the more highly developed with respect to vision and the correspondence to the
mammalian ventral/dorsal streams appears to be caudal/rostral streams involving the nucleus Rotundus
and the ecostriatum (see Nguyen et al 2004). Pigeons' visual system, including right-eye dominance for
visual discrimination learning, may explain why they favor “a featural strategy in analysis of visual scenes”
and may fail to respond to some optical illusions (see discussion in Regolin et al 2004, page 163). More
like humans are chickens, which use the lemnothalamic visual system for tasks that rely on frontal
viewing, and show ``a more balanced and complementary use of the two-eye system'', which may assist
in their more global systems of visual analysis (again, see Regolin et al 2004, page 163). Early papers
suggested that chickens (Winslow 1933), ring doves (Warden and Baar 1929), pigeons (Fujita et al 1993;
Nakamura et al 2006), and both starlings and finches (Dücker 1966) perceived various optical illusions;
some of these studies, however, involved training birds to distinguish a particular stimulus and then
recognize the pattern in testing.
No illusion experiments have been performed on parrots, larger-brained and longer-lived birds whose
visual systems have not, with the exception of studies on UV sensitivity (eg Bowmaker et al 1994, 1996;
Cuthill et al 2000; Goldsmith and Butler 2005; Wilkie et al 1998), been examined as extensively as that of
pigeons or chickens. Behavioral similarities between chickens and parrots, and differences between
parrots and pigeons, on tasks such as object permanence that require amodal completion (see review in
Regolin et al 2004; note Aust and Huber 2006) merely suggest that parrot visual systems more closely
resemble those of chickens than pigeons1. Furthermore, no studies have been performed on an avian
subject that, without any training on the actual task, could simply state vocally whether or not an optical
illusion had been observed. Determining whether a parrot could respond in such a manner would provide
comparative behavioral data and a basis for future comparative studies on more complex types of visual
processing; such data might also stimulate neurobiological studies on parrot visual systems.
The Müller-Lyer illusion was chosen as the initial task because it is well-represented in the scientific
literature. Müller-Lyer (1889/1981) first described how humans either underestimated or overestimated
the length of a line that had arrows attached, respectively, either inwardly < > or outwardly > <.
Researchers suggest that the illusion can result from ``... several factors interacting at different levels of
visual processing, ranging from low-level mechanisms such as optical blur and retinal inhibition, to highlevel mechanisms, such as cognitive contrast and visual attention'' (Predebon 2004, page 916); Sekuler
and Erlebacher (1971) argue that the arrows-in and arrows-out Müller-Lyer illusions are functionally
distinct. A human with visual agnosia failed to detect the illusion, suggesting that it depends on pictorialdepth cues (Gregory 1968; Turnbull et al 2004), but the illusion is preserved in patients with visuospatial
neglect (eg Vallar et al 2000). Changizi and Widders (2002) claim that the illusion is based on a prediction
of where an observer would be moving in space [ie also a three-dimensional (3-D) cue], but other data
(eg experiments and review in Zanker and Abdullah 2004) suggest that filtering in the early visual system
leads to confusion about the location of line endings. Weidner and Fink (2007) argue that the Müller-Lyer
illusion depends on integrating bottom - up visual and top - down cognitive processes. How would a Grey
parrot, with a non-primate brain and visual system, respond to this illusion? As noted earlier, some
evidence exists for the illusion in ring doves (Warden and Baar 1929), pigeons (Nakamura et al 2005,
2006), and chickens (Winslow 1933)2; these studies suggest that, whatever neurobiological systems are
involved, mammalian vision may not be critical for seeing the illusion (Otto-deHaart et al 1999).
The subject in this study was Alex, a Grey parrot with previous training on relative size judgments for 3-D
objects (Pepperberg and Brezinsky 1991). Using a vocal color or material label, he could identify the

larger or smaller object within a set, or state ``none'' if they did not differ in size. Before being tested on
Müller-Lyer figures, he was given familiarization trials to enable transfer of his relative size judgments to
two-dimensional (2-D) figures. Once he began to respond appropriately, he was given various versions of
the Müller-Lyer figure (see below).
The experiments were designed to answer the following queries: Does a Grey parrot (a) see the MüllerLyer illusion at all?; (b) see the illusion under varying conditions of angle and size contrast between the
central line and the arrows (eg Gardner and Long 1961; note Predebon 2004)?; (c) respond appropriately
under control conditions when arrows are replaced by vertical bars? and (d) habituate over time as do
some humans (eg Mountjoy 1958)?
2. Experiment
2.1 Subject
Alex, a 30-year-old male Grey parrot (Psittacus erithacus, figure 1), had been the subject of numerous
cognitive and communicative studies for 29 years (eg Pepperberg 1999). Testing locations and living
conditions when neither testing nor training were in progress are described in Pepperberg and Wilkes
(2004). Food and water were available at his vocal request at all times. In this study he used previously
documented abilities [Pepperberg (1999), colors (rose {red}, green, purple, blue, yellow, orange, grey)],
and to understand the concept of relative size and absence of size difference (Pepperberg and Brezinsky
1991).
2.2 Procedure
2.2.1 Familiarization. Because Alex's prior training on size difference had involved 3-D objects
(Pepperberg and Brezinsky 1991) and his ability to label 2-D representations of 3-D objects was still
under study, he was first shown sets of two differently colored 2-D horizontal lines and asked to identify
the bigger or smaller one or to state ``none'' if they were equally sized. The two horizontal lines, without
arrows, 4 mm in width and of differing colors and lengths (varying between 5 and 15 cm), were drawn 5
cm apart on a standard white 3 × 5 index card; each card had different colored pairs and different size
variations, including lines of equal size.
A randomly chosen card was placed on a felt-covered tray used for other tasks (eg number studies,
object permanence--Pepperberg 1999, 2006). Initially, the tray was held horizontally, approximately 20
cm from one of Alex's eyes, with the experimenter compensating as much as possible for Alex's head
movement so as to maintain presentation in front of a single eye. Subsequently, the tray was held
vertically, approximately 15 cm from one of his eyes, to increase his attentiveness. The experimenter
again compensated, as much as possible, for Alex's head movements to maintain presentation in front of
one eye. Because no one has determined the extent of binocular overlap in a Grey parrot (either the
angular overlap or, given the fairly large thick beak, the distance at which binocular overlap begins) nor
the acuity of vision in the area of binocular overlap3, we opted to constrain presentation to what was likely
to be monocular observation. (Note: Alex will not tolerate even a stray feather near his eye; thus using an
eye patch to ensure monocular vision is not an option.) The distances of the stimuli from Alex's eye in this
study were roughly the same as in all previous projects (eg Pepperberg 1999, 2006).
When Alex made contact with the questioner with the other eye, he was asked ``What color
bigger/smaller?'' He could respond with either color or ``none''. He received one or two familiarization
sessions (~20 min/session) each week for about 6 months with breaks for trainer vacations; sessions
continued until he attended to the cards consistently. Such training was necessary to direct his focus to
the 2-D stimuli; his initial responses were to label the cards themselves (correctly) as `paper' or `four-

corner paper', attempt to chew them, or, most commonly, to ignore the trainer and cards and either state
colors that were not on the cards or begin to preen. We were not concerned with his accuracy because
he had previously demonstrated his understanding of bigger/smaller (Pepperberg and Brezinsky 1991)
and the familiarization procedure was carried out only to ensure that he would respond to the 2-D stimuli.
We specifically did not wish to train him on the task by rewarding and thus reinforcing particular
responses to these queries, so as to avoid cuing him about tests to follow.
Figure 1. Alex viewing one of the stimuli. During trials, the stimulus was centered on Alex's eye; for this
figure, the stimulus was positioned so that it would be visible to the reader.

Figure 2. Colored numerals presented to Alex as a test of acuity. The numerals were presented at three
different sizes (6.3, 12.7, and 25.4 mm) at approximately 10 to 15 cm viewing distance (same distance used
for the illusion figures).

To ensure that Alex was able to focus clearly on the laterally presented stimuli, we gave him a brief test of
visual acuity (figure 2). We asked him to identify the colors of variously sized numerals presented
primarily to one eye (see above) at the same viewing distances that would be used for the Müller-Lyer
figures. The digits 1 through 7 that Alex can identify were presented six at a time in a horizontal row with

a space approximately twice the digit width between each. The digits were uniquely colored with one of
the seven colors that Alex can name. Two different random arrangements of digits, colors, and order
were constructed at each digit size, all on a light-green background. The experimenter asked ``What color
7?'', for example, and ``orange'' would be the correct answer for the display in figure 2. The different-sized
digit sets and the alternate displays for each size were selected in random order from trial to trial.
Figure 3. Representative versions of the Müller-Lyer illusion; different colors pairs represent the variety used
in each figure: (a) 4 mm shafts and 1 mm arrows on a white background; (b) 4 mm shafts and 1 mm arrows
on a black background; (c) 4 mm shafts and 1 mm perpendicular arrows on a black background; (d) 6 mm
shafts and 1 mm arrows on a black background; (e) 2 mm shafts and 1 mm arrows on a black background; (f)
4 mm shafts and 4 mm arrows on a black background; (g) 2 mm shafts and 1 mm arrows at 80°; (h) 6 mm
shafts and 1 mm arrows at 10°.

2.2.2 Brentano variation of Müller-Lyer figures. Alex was tested on the Brentano variation of the standard
Müller-Lyer illusion (figure 3). This version, considered to be equivalent to the presentation of two
separate figures (eg Sadza and de Weert 1984), ensured that he focused on both illusions

simultaneously. Use of two central line colors and differently colored arrows allowed the experimenters to
ask the parrot questions and receive its answers vocally, a reasonable trade for a small reduction such
color differences might possibly cause in the strength of the illusion, if Alex responded as do humans. For
humans, using differently colored arrowheads and shafts reduces the illusion by only 4%-6% [Miyahara
2006; Mukerji 1957; Sadza and de Weert 1984; note that Lamy et al (2006) found ~10% reduction, but did
not use solid figures]; using different central-line colors in the Brentano version might further decrease the
illusion by only another 3%-4% according to Miyahara (2006), who suggests that a format that separates
the two central lines facilitates accurate assessment of their length and thus a reduction of the illusion.
Such a procedure allows replication of the form of the question while requiring a number of different
answers (one of seven color labels or “none”'), which decreases the possibility of inadvertent cuing or
training to a specific outcome. Interestingly, scientists initially suggested that using shafts and arrows of
different colors would lead to more retinal blur and a larger illusion, but such is not the case, at least for
humans (Coren et al 1978).
The initial Brentano figures were constructed so as to balance several concerns. Central lines were 10 cm
long and 4 mm wide, half of one color and half of another, with black arrows 1 mm wide and 2.5 cm long
emanating at 45° angles from the horizontal. The 45° angle and 1 mm width for the arrows were chosen
as being both representative and intermediate in terms of processing of the illusion (eg Sekuler and
Erlebacher 1971). The central lines were drawn so as to appear in front of the arrows, maximizing the
illusion (Miyahara 2006). Sizes for the central lines and arrows were chosen so they could be clearly seen
against the background and so that the arrows indeed appeared to emanate from the ends of the central
lines. Stimuli were produced on a color laser printer (Panasonic KX-CL510), and Alex was tested with
samples (single lines without arrows) prior to the introduction of the test stimuli to ensure that he would
label the printed colors appropriately. Thus colors such as orange and purple--which can be problematic
for Alex to identify (Pepperberg 1994, 2006) because parrots' abilities to see in the UV cause their color
perception to differ somewhat from that of humans (Bowmaker et al 1994, 1996; Cuthill et al 2000;
Goldsmith and Butler 2005; Wilkie et al 1998)--were adjusted appropriately.
Stimuli were, as in the familiarization trials, placed on a felt tray and held up vertically; Alex was asked
either “What color bigger?” or “What color smaller?”, in roughly equal proportions. Arguably, vertical
placement might reduce the strength of the Müller-Lyer illusion (Heller 1992; Heller et al 2005) by
reducing perceptual error and encouraging egocentric coding. During familiarization trials, however, Alex
was far more likely to attend to vertical than horizontal stimuli, whatever the size differential of the lines.
Thus the decision was made to retain the vertical presentation for the Müller-Lyer stimuli. Note that half of
the time the stimulus was as shown in figure 3 and half of the time it was reversed so that the outward
arrows were to the left to avoid any placement bias. Colors were mixed and matched, such that the
purportedly correct response (that of seeing the illusion) was divided equally over the six colors he could
label. We did, however, eliminate a few specific color combinations (orange with red or yellow, purple with
red or blue) that Alex had in the past been likely to confuse because his color perception differed from
that of humans (Pepperberg 1999).
2.2.3 White background tests with black arrows. These initial 6 trials, with stimuli depicted in figure 3a,
were designed to determine if Alex was attending to both the arrows and the shafts. He labels the color
black (as ``grey'') and thus could label all three elements of the figure, the two halves of the shaft and the
arrows. When queried about `smaller'' (2 trials), he should respond with the color of the arrows--which
were indeed the smallest item--rather than of a shaft. When queried about ``bigger'' (4 trials), he should
label the half of the central shaft that he saw as longer. Thus, on trials with black arrows, his responses to
``What color smaller?'' were controls to determine if he could separate out the regions of interest--the
shafts--from the arrows (a necessary behavior to ensure that he was not responding based on the

distances including the arrows); his responses to ``What color bigger?'' were probes of the Müller-Lyer
illusion.
2.2.4 Black background tests with white arrows. Interspersed with white background tests, and
predominating later in the schedule, were 56 trials in which the stimuli were drawn on a black background
with white arrows (figures 3b - 3h). Alex did not have the label `white', and thus would be more likely to
use the color of the central line to respond to ``What color smaller?''. For these stimuli, both queries
(smaller, bigger) were probes of the illusion.
Ten stimuli were identical in form to those described above except for the reversal of background and
arrow color (figure 3b); five additional types of stimuli, all on the black background, completed the series.
As a control, on 3 trials the arrows were replaced by vertical bars perpendicular to the shafts (figure 3c) to
determine, when the illusion definitely did not exist for human observers, whether Alex would respond
“none” appropriately. Other stimuli were presented with central shaft widths that varied from the previous
4 mm: 6 mm width on 5 trials and 2 mm width on 11 trials (figures 3d, 3e). On these trials, the angle of the
arrows remained at 458 and their width remained at 1 mm. We also included 20 trials with equal shaft and
arrow widths (4 mm for both--figure 3f) as they are in standard tests with human observers. These
variations tested whether emphasizing or de-emphasizing the shafts in contrast to the arrows would alter
the effect of the illusion, as it does for humans (Coren and Porac 1983). Stimuli with thin shafts and
arrows (2 mm and 1 mm, respectively) and those with equal-width shafts and arrows (4 mm) should
present the same illusion as the figures with medium shaft width and thin arrows (4 mm and 1 mm,
respectively) but the illusion might fail with the thicker shafts and thin arrows (6 mm and 1 mm,
respectively) if Alex responds as did Coren and Porac's human observers, for whom concentration on the
shafts decreased the strength of the illusion.
The final two sets of figures involved angles at 10° and 80°, again on black backgrounds. We included
figures with 2 mm shafts with arrows approaching the vertical (80°--figure 3g) and 6 mm shafts with
arrows approaching the horizontal (10°--figure 3h) to determine if such perturbations shifted attention,
respectively, to and from the shafts (Sekuler and Erlebacher 1971) and thus diminished or accentuated
the effects of the illusion.
2.3 Test procedure
Initial testing, involving 32 trials, occurred on average 2 - 5 times per week from December 7, 2005 to
June 7, 2006, with breaks for experimenter absences and scheduled dishabituation periods. Breaks of 1 3 weeks occurred after trials 16, 18, 21, 24, 29, 43, 47, 53, and 60 to determine if what appeared to be
habituation to the illusion was indeed occurring, and whether absence of testing for a defined period
would reinstate a response to the illusion. If no breaks, which often followed massed trials, are noted, 1 2 trials were given on sequential days. The second set of testing, involving another 32 trials, occurred
with the same frequency from July 7, 2006 until September 14, 2006. Between these two sets was one
trial with perpendicular arrows as an additional control (presented in both figures 4a and 4b for continuity).
Test questions were presented intermittently either during free periods (when Alex was requesting various
foods or interactions) or during sessions on current (and thus unrelated) topics (eg testing Alex on
number concepts).
Details of test procedures, including descriptions of precautions against inadvertent and expectation cuing
are in Pepperberg (1981, 1994); summaries are below. A trial was generally repeated in a session only if
Alex's initial answer was either a color that was not being presented or an indistinct response (eg
Pepperberg 1981, 1987). Thus the number of times stimuli were presented to Alex depended on his
behavior. Unless he produced a color not being presented or spoke indistinctly, he received praise and

was allowed to request a reward. If his response was a nonexistent color label or indistinct, the examiner
removed the tray, turned his/her head, and said “No!”. Presentation continued until an appropriate
identification was made or four attempts occurred; errors were recorded. If Alex consistently responded
with nonexistent colors, the trial was dropped for noncompliance (see Pepperberg and Gordon 2005).
When, approximately halfway through the first set of test trials, Alex began to respond ``none'' to every
stimulus, for several trials (see below) he was asked, ``Are you sure? What color bigger/smaller?'' to
ensure that he was not simply failing to attend; on such trials he was queried a total of four times.
As in all studies with Alex, the protocol differed from one used with other animals in two respects. First,
the task capitalized on Alex's ability to work in the vocal mode; second, each trial was presented
intermittently during training and testing of other unrelated topics also under study. Alex's responses thus
had to be chosen from his entire repertoire (490 vocalizations, including labels for foods and locations)
and from among numerous possible topics concerning various exemplars and questions during each
session; that is, although the presence of the specific stimuli likely did cue Alex to the type of task being
tested, he still had to attend to the specific type of question being posed. This design not only increased
the complexity of the task, but prevented several forms of cuing (see below, also Pepperberg 1999;
Premack 1976, page 132).
Test situations included specific precautions to avoid cuing. One control was a design such that each test
session was, as noted above, presented intermittently during free periods or work on unrelated topics. An
examiner who, for example, poses a series of similar questions may come to expect a particular answer
and unconsciously accept an indistinct (and by our criteria incorrect) response of, for example, “gree” (a
mix of “green” and “three”) for “green”. As noted above, Alex's responses had to be chosen from his entire
repertoire and from among numerous possible topics during each session. Second, in general, a human
other than the one presenting the tray (one of three possible individuals in these studies), who did not
know what was on the tray, confirmed the answer; his/her interpretation of Alex's response was thus
unlikely to be influenced by expectation of a certain label. Only after his/her confirmation was Alex
rewarded (Pepperberg 1981). Third, this evaluator was unlikely to be influenced by hearing the type of
question posed: in a previous study, transcriptions of contextless tapes of Alex's responses in a session
agreed 98.2% with original evaluations (Pepperberg 1992)4. Fourth, because Alex had not been trained
on this task, no overlap occurred between training and testing situations and, because training on color
labels had occurred years before, by students no longer present, he could not have picked up on trainerinduced cues specific to a given label (Pepperberg 1981).
Any direct cuing or training of Alex as to the correct answer by the presenter was highly unlikely for four
reasons. First, in a previous two-item relative-size test in which the presenter was blind to the task (items
were hidden in a cigar box) and the evaluator was out of Alex's view, Alex's accuracy of 78.7%
(Pepperberg and Brezinsky 1991) was equivalent to his usual ~80% rate (Pepperberg 1999); tests,
however, took twice as long because of difficulty of maintaining Alex's attention to the task. Here, in four
a-posteriori control trials in which the experimenter could not see the stimuli (figure 3f versions,
counterbalanced for question and arrow direction) and the evaluator was again out of Alex's view, the
only effect was that trials took almost 15 min each because Alex could now use one of his eyes to focus
on, and be distracted by, other events in the lab; he reported the illusion in the expected direction on
5
three of the four trials, obviating the issue of cuing . Second, unlike figure 1, which is posed as noted, the
stimulus was centered on one of Alex's eyes such that his head blocked most of the stimulus from the
experimenter, and the experimenter's eyes were focused entirely on Alex's other eye and maintained that
focus during questioning. Thus, the experimenter's eye gaze could not cue Alex as to which side (the
`bigger' or `smaller') was correct in a given trial. Moreover, if he were indeed cuing into an experimenter's
gaze to determine which color to label, he would not have made so many responses of “none” when the

illusion was seen by the experimenter. Third, because the stimulus direction varied and questions varied
between targeting bigger or smaller (ie questions were neither massed nor did not necessarily alternate,
but could be either the same or different on a given day, and often only one question was asked on a
given day), Alex could not learn to respond, for example, only to colors associated with arrows pointing in
a particular direction, or to the right or left side. Also, because the specific response (one of six colors or
‘none’) varied from trial to trial, Alex could not be trained or cued as to one proper response, and the
experimenter would praise him equally well no matter what he said (unless the response was, as noted
above, irrelevant). Fourth, he was unlikely to have been trained or been cued as to the association
between arrow direction and size, because his first actual error (giving a response in the incorrect
direction) did not occur until trial 22.
Figure 4. Cumulative longitudinal graphs of Alex's reports for the Müller-Lyer figures. For each trial where
Alex reported the illusion, the trace increases by one. When Alex reported no difference, the trace remains
flat, and where he reported a difference in the direction opposite to the illusion, the trace drops. An overall
rising trace indicates that Alex is systematically reporting the illusion. The record includes trials where an
illusion is expected on the basis of human data (all blue and black square symbols, for example) and control
trials where no illusion is expected (see text for details). The W and B in the key for the data symbols refer,
respectively, to trials with white and black backgrounds; the trial values indicate the width of the central lines
(shafts)--the arrows were always 1 mm in width. The degree notations refer to the angle of the arrow from the
horizontal. The trace here represents the first set of trials, (a), from December 7, 2005 to June 7, 2006, and the
continued trace, (b), the second set from July 7, 2006 to September 14, 2006. Trial 33 (a control version with
perpendicular arrows) is on both charts for continuity.

As in previous studies (eg Pepperberg 2006), a small percentage of sessions was videotaped and
subsequently analyzed to ensure interobserver reliability. If interobserver reliability with a blind, naive
coder was high, we could be assured of the validity of other trials. Given that Alex was more interested in
the student performing the taping and the video camera rather than the objects to be labeled, such trials
were difficult to execute and kept to a minimum. Four trials were digitized and presented to observers
who had never interacted with Alex. One such trial is included as supplementary material.
3. Results
Alex's data were scored as ‘illusion reported’ if he named the color of the shaft that human observers
would report, as ‘no illusion’ if he reported “none”, and ‘opposite the illusion’ if he reported the color
opposite to the illusion response. A cumulative trace of his responses across the various Müller-Lyer
figures is shown in figures 4a and 4b. Percentages of reports in the illusion direction for standard and
control versions are tabulated in figure 5. The test procedure also allowed a question to be repeated (up
to four times) until Alex named one of the two shaft colors or, in one control, the arrow color, or stated
(and stuck with) “none”. In general, Alex's first report was one of these appropriate responses. In about
10% of the trials, however, Alex initially stated colors that were not present but when queried a second
time, gave one color that was present. Given that his accuracy in labeling colors is 80%-85% (errors
occur either because of lack of attention to the stimuli or because stimuli that appear as one color to
humans may appear as a different color to parrots--Pepperberg 1999), the second responses were used
for these trials.
3.1 Longitudinal responses
Figures 4a and 4b show Alex's trial-by-trial responses. He reported the illusion in about 65% of the trials
where human observers would have shown the classic illusion (figure 5) and he showed a lessened or
absent illusion in control trials where humans would not have shown the illusion. As shown in figure 4a,
Alex initially reported the illusion with stimuli having 4 mm shafts and 1 mm arrows (black and white
squares), then showed loss of the illusion after repeated trials, starting at trial 13.With the exception of the
5 control trials on which he was not expected to report the illusion (2 of these were trials with white
background tests, diamonds on figure 4a, where he was asked ``What color smaller?'' and where he
could and did respond with the color of the arrows; 3 were figures with perpendicular arrows where no
illusion is expected), he reported the illusion on 8 of his first 9 experimental trials (numbers 2, 3, 4, 6, 8,
10, 12, 13) with 4 mm shafts and 1 mm arrows. On the next 3 trials, however, he responded “none”,
possibly habituating to the illusion after repeated exposures (Mountjoy 1958). During further testing after
a 2-week break, he again reported the illusion. As the trials continued, Alex showed continued illusion
responses on the appropriate trials and the cumulative score rose steadily with only two reversals out of
all 65 trials and only 18/50 null responses on trials where an illusion was expected, several of which may
have been caused by habituation after repeated exposures.
3.2 Effect of shaft and arrow width
Shaft width systematically affected Alex's responses (figures 4a, 4b, 5). He showed a consistent illusion
response with the thinnest shafts (2 mm, 8/11 illusion responses). Responses were again strongly in the
illusion direction with the intermediate shaft width and arrows (4 mm shaft, 1 mm arrows, 9/14) and with
the intermediate shaft and equal width arrows (both 4 mm, 12/20). However, he never reported the
illusion for 6 mm shafts and 1 mm arrows (0/5) even on trials after breaks from testing of 3 weeks (after
trial 18) or 2 weeks (after trial 24). Alex does not appear to be responding to the overall lengths of the
stimuli rather than to the illusion, as his responses varied from 0% to 73% for stimuli with exactly the
same lengths but varying ratios of shaft/arrow widths.

Figure 5. Percentage of stimuli for which Alex reported the Müller-Lyer illusion, broken down for shaft width,
background color, controls, and arrow angles. W refers to trials on white backgrounds. ‘Shorter query’ refers
to trials on white background, where Alex was asked “What color smaller?” and could answer the arrow
color. With black backgrounds (B) the arrows were white, a color that Alex cannot name and so his answers,
even for “What color shorter?”, were limited to the two shaft colors. ‘mm’ refers to the width of the central
lines (shafts). The arrows were always 1 mm in width except for the one condition with 4 mm arrows (sixth
from left). The degree notations refer to the angle of the arrow from the horizontal.

3.2 Effect of shaft and arrow width
Shaft width systematically affected Alex's responses (figures 4a, 4b, 5). He showed a consistent illusion
response with the thinnest shafts (2 mm, 8/11 illusion responses). Responses were again strongly in the
illusion direction with the intermediate shaft width and arrows (4 mm shaft, 1 mm arrows, 9/14) and with
the intermediate shaft and equal width arrows (both 4 mm, 12/20). However, he never reported the
illusion for 6 mm shafts and 1 mm arrows (0/5) even on trials after breaks from testing of 3 weeks (after
trial 18) or 2 weeks (after trial 24). Alex does not appear to be responding to the overall lengths of the
stimuli rather than to the illusion, as his responses varied from 0% to 73% for stimuli with exactly the
same lengths but varying ratios of shaft/arrow widths.
3.3 Effect of arrow angle
The angles of the arrows had a strong effect, yielding a greater frequency of illusion reports for more
acute angles and fewer or none for less acute angles. On the three trials with the arrow perpendicular to
the shaft (9, 11, and 33), Alex responded “none” as do human observers. When the arrow angle was set
to 80°, approaching perpendicularity (figure 3g), he reported the illusion on only 1 of 5 trials. At the other
extreme, when the arrows were set to 10° (figure 3h), Alex reported the illusion on 3 of 5 trials even
though the shaft width was 6 mm, a width for which he did not report an illusion with the arrows at 45°
angles.

3.4 Habituation
When trials were massed--more than one or two trials per day over several successive days--Alex often
seemed to habituate, changing his illusion response to “none”. This result can be seen at a number of
points in the cumulative record (trials 13, 41, and 57 for example). A break in testing typically restored the
illusion responses.
3.5 Responses to ``What color smaller?'' versus ``What color bigger?''
With the white-background stimuli, only 2 trials (1 and 7) were run in which Alex was asked “What color
smaller?”. In both, he responded “grey”, the color of the arrows that were in fact the smallest elements in
the test (‘grey’ is his label for items that range from grey through black). For the four tests with the white
background when the question was “What color bigger?”, Alex responded in the illusion direction on all 4
trials. With the black-background tests, the arrows were white, a color for which Alex had no label; he was
thus likely to respond with a color for the shaft. For these tests, half the trials were “What color bigger?”
and the other half “What color smaller?”. No systematic difference existed in responses for these two
types of trials for the black-background figures when illusion responses were expected (63% and 65%,
respectively).
3.6 Interobserver reliability
4 trials were videotaped, digitized, and presented auditorially to four different observers (two female, two
male) who were completely naive with respect to Alex's speech patterns; they could not see the stimuli
Alex was being shown. All four agreed on their responses to all four samples. If we collapse all trials over
all listeners, interobserver reliability is 100%.
3.7 Visual acuity
Alex's acuity was tested with three sets of digits of different sizes (6.3, 12.7, and 25.4 mm in height). The
letters were arranged on a background at a viewing distance of 10 to 15 cm and Alex had to name the
color of a probed digit (“What color 5?”). Performance was quite good (for the small number of trials)
down to the smallest size tested. For the larger digits, Alex had 2 of 2 trials correct, for the 12.7 mm digits,
3 of 4 correct, and for the 6.3 mm digits, 4 of 5 correct. Because the Müller-Lyer figures were 10 cm or
more in length, an order of magnitude larger than the small digits, there is little evidence that Alex would
suffer any substantive blurring of the figure or even of the details where the central shaft met the arrows.
4. Discussion
Alex can, under a variety of conditions, perceive the Müller-Lyer illusion, thus demonstrating that neither
human neuroanatomy and processing nor human binocular vision are required for such perception.
Attention likely plays some role in the strength of the illusion as might visual experience. Our study also
has implications for further comparative research.
4.1 Effects of stimulus variation
Alex's responses varied not with the overall length of the stimuli (arrows plus shaft) but with the ratio of
the shaft/arrow width as well as the shaft/arrow angle. Had he responded solely to the total length of the
stimuli (ie learned to respond to ``What color bigger?'' for outward arrows and to ``What color smaller?''
for inward arrows), he would not have failed to see the illusion in stimuli such as figure 3d and would have
seen the illusion more often than he did for stimuli based on figure 3f. Thus the data cannot be explained
by a response to the overall length of the stimuli.

4.2 Comparative neurobiology, binocular vision
Questions asking what brain areas are involved in processing the Müller-Lyer illusion and what areas
might be functioning comparably in avian and human brains are still not fully answered. Data from a
recent MRI study (Weidner and Fink 2007) suggest that the Müller-Lyer illusion in humans is processed in
the lateral occipital cortex (LOC) and the right superior parietal cortex, with clear involvement of the right
intraparietal sulcus (IPS). The LOC seems to process the line segments into the Müller-Lyer figure (note
Tyler et al 2004); the posterior parietal cortex appears to integrate this information with 2-D depth cues
and size-constancy scaling. Whether the human LOC relates to the lemnothalamic or collothalamic
pathways--or a combination of both--in parrots is not known, but birds' visual areas function in a manner
corresponding to the LOC (Butler et al 2005). Other studies have shown that human spatial attention and
non-symbolic comparisons are also correlated to IPS activity (Coull and Nobre 1998; Fias et al 2003;
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Göbel et al 2001, 2004; Jordan et al 2004; Simon 1999) ; as noted previously (Pepperberg 2006), such
abilities are essential for non-human survival (eg for predator detection; foraging comparisons) and nonhumans are thus likely to have analogous, if not homologous, brain areas. Although no MRI studies for
the Müller-Lyer illusion have been performed on parrots, the avian nidopallium caudolaterale (NCL) and
the dorsolateral corticoid (CDL) areas, which respectively are likely homologues of the posterior parietal
cortex and parts of the prefrontal cortex (Butler et al 2005), would probably be involved in such
processing.
Finally, Mountjoy (1960) demonstrated that, for humans, the Müller-Lyer illusion was less pronounced
under monocular than binocular vision. Although we could not be sure that Alex was indeed viewing the
illusion monocularly, it is possible that monocular vision might have contributed to his responses being
less consistent than those that would have been found in human observers. As noted above, little is
known about binocular overlap in Grey parrots, but it is purportedly somewhat less than 10% (Walls
1942).
4.3 Attention
If humans attend to the shaft and ignore the arrows, the illusion is attenuated (see Gardner and Long
1961). Attentional effects may underlie some of the variability in response seen with Alex as well. Asking
Alex about the colors of the shafts and making them six times the width of the arrows and changing the
angle with respect to the shaft may have drawn his attention away from the arrows and reduced the
illusion. He showed no length illusion in the perpendicular-arrow condition, a control to ensure that he was
responding to the stimuli, nor to the 6 mm-shaft condition, similar to the performance of human observers
when the shaft is emphasized compared to the arrows (Coren and Porac 1983). He also showed a loss of
the illusion after repeated trials, and a recovery following breaks in testing. Several researchers, from
Mountjoy (1958) and Rudel and Teuber (1963) through Predebon (1998, 2006) have reported
decrements of human perception of the Müller-Lyer illusion as a function of repeated exposure (see
review in Millar and Al-Attar 2002); such an effect could have also occurred for Alex. Alex could, of
course, simply have lost interest in the stimuli after repeated exposures, even though the exposures were
not massed as densely as those in human studies. His lack of interest in a task is, however, generally
expressed in either a total failure to respond or in a string of consistently incorrect responses (eg
Pepperberg and Gordon 2005); nevertheless, he may have used ``none'' in such a manner in this study.
4.4 Visual experience
A separate but equally intriguing issue involves the effect of environmental stimuli on visual processing
abilities. Specifically, humans living in what is often called a ‘non-carpentered world’--ie an environment
without significant examples of right-angled, parallel - perpendicular intersections--experience some

optical illusions differently from humans in carpentered societies; in fact, some do not see the Müller-Lyer
illusion at all (Segall et al 1966). Interestingly, in some non-carpentered societies children do see the
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Müller-Lyer illusions and adults do not whereas the opposite is true in other societies , although few
subjects of any age in non-carpentered societies see the illusion to the same extent as do Westerners (eg
Segall et al 1966). Thus, for humans, the illusion is not likely innately specified but develops or degrades
after interaction with the environment. One would expect wild parrots--likely lacking evolutionary
pressures that would favor an adaptation for sensitivity to right-angled, parallel - perpendicular stimuli—to
react as do humans in a non-carpentered society. Any captive-born parrot would, however, have the
same experience as humans in carpentered societies, but would process these experiences with a nonprimate visual system. Demonstrating that even one captive Grey parrot responds to the Müller-Lyer
illusion somewhat as do humans in carpentered societies strengthens the argument for the effects of
visual input on the processing of the Müller-Lyer illusion (note McCauley and Henrich 2006), although
comparisons with wild-caught parrots would be required for conclusive evidence.
5. Conclusion
At least one Grey parrot, Alex, reports the Müller-Lyer illusion under certain conditions. We recognize that
our comparisons between parrots and humans, and even parrots and other avian species, are
speculative, and are presented in order to generate further interest in cross-species comparisons. Our
data suggest that this parrot would provide interesting information on other optical illusions and be an
appropriate subject for other comparative studies of visual processing.

Notes
1

An avian veterinarian, Dr Greg Harrison (personal communication, 4-14-06), also suggested that the
parrot system was more like that of a chicken than a pigeon.

2

Again, some of these studies involved memory rather than direct choice.

3

Walls (1942) states that most parrots have a binocular overlap of 6%-10%, but does not specify which
species were studied. No data exist concerning the foveae of Grey parrots nor concerning their areas of
highest visual acuity.
4

This percentage represented 106 matches of 108 vocalizations. As an additional control, the principal
investigator made two transcriptions of a student, new to the lab, as he responded to the same type of
questions as Alex. The first transcription was live; the second, made several days later, was of a tape
from which all questions had been edited. The two transcriptions of the student's vocalizations matched to
within 95.8% (68 of 71 vocalizations).

5

Fisher's exact test on Alex's results for figure 3f trials during the experiment and after it show no
significant differences ( p = 0:514, one-tailed).

6

Coull and Nobre (1998) suggest that the left IPS is more active in temporal attention and the right IPS in
spatial attention, but Fias et al (2003) find more activity in the left IPS for representation of symbolic and
nonsymbolic magnitude. Cohen et al (2000) show that small bilateral intraparietal foci are more active in
calculation abilities than in control tasks that also involve similar types of spatial or attentional abilities.

7

Note work by Brosvic et al (2002) suggesting that 13 - 15 years seems to be the age at which Western
children's decreasing sensitivity to the Müller-Lyer illusion reaches an asymptote.
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